In classical mechanism design setting the outcome of the mechanism is computed by a trusted central party. 
Introduction
The Internet has emerged as the global platform for computation and communication. It offers nearly unlimited resources that could be utilized to solve a vast array of problems. The Internet resources are controlled and operated by a multitude of self-interested, independent parties. These agents may manipulate the protocols in their own benefit and their selfish behavior may lead to degraded performance and reduced efficiency. Solving such problems involving selfish agents is the object of mechanism design theory (also called implementation theory) [13] . This theory helps design protocols in which the agents are given incentives to tell the truth and follow the rules. Such mechanisms or protocols are called truthful or strategyproof. Each participating agent has a £ This research was supported in part by Wayne State University Faculty Research Grant privately known function called valuation which quantifies the agent benefit or loss. The valuation depends on the outcome and is reported to a centralized mechanism. The mechanism chooses an outcome that maximizes a given objective function and makes payments to the agents. The valuations and payments are expressed in some common unit of currency. The payments are designed and used to motivate the agents to report their true valuations. Reporting the true valuations leads to an optimal value for the objective function. The goal of each agent is to maximize the sum of her valuation and payment.
Traditionally, we were mostly concerned with the computational tractability, but now we must jointly address incentive compatibility. This led to the development of algorithmic mechanism design (AMD) [12] . The AMD model assumes a centralized trusted party which computes the outcomes of the mechanism. This model cannot be always used to solve problems that are inherently distributed, thus creating the necessity of distributed implementations. Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) [6] has the same objectives as AMD, but in addition the model is characterized by the distribution of the agents, information, and computation. In DAMD agents themselves determine the outcome of the mechanism. This solution creates new opportunities for the agents to manipulate the protocols. Any distributed implementation must address this problem in addition to the other issues form the standard AMD.
In their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen proposed the strongly truthful MinWork [12] mechanism. The objective of MinWork is to allocate a batch of tasks to a set of agents such that the completion time of the last assignment is minimized. It assumes a trusted central administrator with which the agents freely communicate. The administrator accepts the agents' bids and computes the schedule as a function of the bids. The problem associ-ated with this approach is that the administrator must be trusted by all parties and has limited scalability and reliability.
We propose a distributed variant of MinWork called Distributed MinWork (DMW). DMW does not use a central administrator, but instead, the agents themselves compute the schedule. Our solution is based on the idea presented in [2, 8] . A set of simultaneous distributed auctions determine the allocation and the payment function, while protecting the anonymity of the losing agents and the privacy of their bids. The mechanism is resilient to deviation in the sense that cheaters are detected and eliminated from participating. DMW has low communication and computation complexity.
Related Work. Nisan and Ronen [12] introduced algorithmic mechanism design (AMD), which bridged computational tractability with incentive compatibility. In their work, they used the celebrated Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG) [3, 7, 18] mechanism in designing mechanisms for several standard problems in computer science. They proposed a polynomial-time mechanism called MinWork, which is a Ò-approximation (where Ò is the number of agents) to the scheduling problem.
Feigenbaum et al. [4, 5] initiated the study of DAMD for cost sharing in multicast trees and lowest-cost unicast routing. Mitchell and Teague [9] extended the multicast mechanism by devising a new model where the nodes are controlled by the strategic agents and are permitted to deviate from the protocol. Cheating is detected through the use of digital signatures and when detected, results in heavy fines. Monderer and Tennenholtz [10] studied a single-item auction problem considering a model in which agents communicate with the trusted central party by forwarding messages through other agents.
Ng et al. [11] broadens DAMD to envision competing distributed mechanisms in an open marketplace. Shneidman and Parkes [17] studied the problem of creating distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in systems composed of rational nodes. A faithful implementation guarantees that no node will deviate from the specifications. Parkes and Shneidman [14] considered distributed mechanism implementations. They proposed a set of principles that can be used to develop faithful implementations. Brandt and Sandholm [1] investigated how existing cryptographic building blocks can be used to ensure the correctness and the privacy in distributed mechanisms.
Contributions.
We propose a distributed scheduling mechanism called Distributed MinWork (DMW) which is a distributed implementation of the centralized scheduling mechanism proposed in [12] . The agents themselves compute the allocation and payment functions by participating in simultaneous Vickrey auctions. Our design is based on the idea proposed in [2, 8] . An agent encodes its bid in the degree of a randomly chosen polynomial and then transmits the shares to the other agents. The shares are used by each agent as input to a degree resolution procedure. By determining the degree, an agent is able to determine the winner, the first price, and the second price. The identities and the bids of the loosing agents are not revealed. DMW is resilient to agents deviating from the protocol since the cheaters are detected and eliminated from further participation. We show that DMW is a truthful mechanism, since it preserves the incentives and allocation policies from MinWork. Finally, we show that DMW has polynomial communication and computation costs.
Considering the scheduling on unrelated machines problem, DMW provides insight into Open Problem 10, 11 and 12 from [6] . Regarding Open Problem 10, the centralized MinWork can be simply distributed among obedient nodes. By using cryptographic protocol-design, we are able to develop a distributed mechanism with a much more realistic strategic model that tolerates strategic and adversarial nodes. Regarding Open Problem 11, DMW tolerates protocol deviations. As long as the number of agents obeying the protocol remains above a threshold, the mechanism is computable. If the number of agents drops below the threshold, the mechanism cannot be executed. Regarding Open Problem 12, DMW efficiently protects the privacy of the agents. It is, however, imperfect since it reveals some information (see Theorem 4.2). The set of participating agents must be known, but this knowledge is intrinsic to the scheduling problem.
Organization. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the theory and primitives on which our distributed scheduling mechanism is based. In Section 3 we present and detail our proposed mechanism. In Section 4 we discuss the merits and costs. In Section 5 we draw conclusions and present future directions.
Preliminaries

The scheduling problem
We consider here the problem of scheduling Ñ ½ independent tasks Ì ½ Ì ¾ Ì Ñ on Ò ½ agents (ma- given objective function such as makespan, sum of completion times, etc. In the scheduling literature, this problem is known as scheduling on unrelated machines [15] .
Scheduling Mechanisms
In this section we first formally describe the scheduling mechanism design problem and then present the scheduling mechanism. An agent may report a value (bid) for a task Ì different from its true value Ø . The true value characterizes the actual processing capacity of agent . The goal of a truthful scheduling mechanism is to give incentives to agents such that it is beneficial for them to report their true values. Now we give a formal description of a mechanism and define the concept of truthful mechanism.
Definition 2.2. (Mechanism)
A mechanism is a pair of functions: Nisan and Ronen [12] designed a truthful mechanism for this problem. The authors provided an approximation mechanism called MinWork, minimizing the total amount of work. MinWork is a truthful mechanism. In terms of makespan it achieves an approximation ratio of Ò. In the following we present the MinWork mechanism. [12] The mechanism that gives an approximate solution to the scheduling problem is defined by the following two functions:
Definition 2.4. (MinWork Mechanism)
(i) The allocation function: each task is allocated to the agent who is able to execute the task in a minimum amount of time (Allocation is random when there are more than one agent with minimum type).
(ii) The payment function for agent given by:
The MinWork mechanism can be viewed as running separate Vickrey auctions simultaneously for each task. In this paper we design a distributed version of MinWork.
Polynomial Degree Resolution
In our distributed mechanism each agent encodes its bid in the degree of a random polynomial. The agents will collaboratively determine the winning bid by performing a polynomial degree resolution procedure based on Lagrange interpolation. In the following we present the basic concepts related to polynomial degree resolution. and assuming random picking of the polynomial coefficients from £ Ô then the degree resolution mistakenly succeeds with probability ½ Ô . This probability is very small assuming a very large prime Ô.
An efficient algorithm for computing ´×µ´¼ µ is given below [2] . If we assume that the cost of multiplication operation is equal to the cost of computing the multiplicative inverse, it is obvious that the computational complexity of the algorithm is × ¾ · ×. In our proposed mechanism we will use a distributed version of this algorithm. In the distributed version, each agent broadcasts « to the other agents. The rest of the computation is performed locally by each agent.
The Distributed Scheduling Mechanism
The MinWork mechanism proposed in [12] requires a trusted central administrator to which each agent reports its private information. Based on the information received from the agents the central administrator determines the allocation and informs the agents about the allocation. There are several drawbacks of using a central administrator. First, the administrator must be trusted by all the agents that it will properly accept bids and compute the resulting schedule. This is problematic when several autonomous administrative domains must cooperate to choose an administrator. Second, it offers limited scalability. The administrator is a bottleneck, it performs most of the computations and it is either the sender or receiver in all communications. Third, the administrator is a single point of failure which offers very limited reliability.
In a Distributed scheduling mechanism there is no central administrator involved, but instead, the agents collaborate among themselves to compute the schedule and the payments. Agents' bids implicitly contain private information (e.g., the bids provide insight into an agent's processing capabilities). Scheduling mechanisms must ensure the privacy of the agents and their bids, and that any exposed information cannot be used to manipulate the outcome.
We propose a distributed scheduling mechanism called Distributed MinWork (DMW). To design the DMW mechanism we exploit the fact that MinWork can be viewed as running separate Vickrey auctions for each task simultaneously. We base our design on the idea presented in [2, 8] . An agent encodes its bid in the degree of a randomly chosen polynomial and then transmits the shares to the other agents. The shares are used by each agent as input in the degree resolution procedure. By determining the degree, an agent is able to determine the winner, the first price, and the second price. Disclosing all this information is unnecessary, but in Theorem 4.2, we show that for this specific problem the risk is minimal. DMW is truthful as it preserves the incentives and allocation policies of MinWork. Bid encoding. In the existing secret sharing protocols [16] , the information is encoded in the free term of a polynomial, but in the scheme devised by Kikuchi [8] , the bids are encoded in the degree of the polynomial. The benefit is that the polynomials can be summed and degree resolution on the sum of the polynomials reveals the minimum bid while concealing the other bids. In our mechanism the degree of the polynomial is inversely related to the bids, i.e., small bids are encoded in large-degreed polynomials and vice versa. This secret sharing technique is based on the threshold trust model. To increase resilience, the bids are summed before encoding with the maximum number of faulty agents denoted by . At least agents are required to collude in order to expose any bids. If fewer agents collude, no bids are exposed.
In the following we describe our Distributed MinWork (DMW) Mechanism. Notations. The following notations are used in describing DMW.
Ô Õ are large primes such that Õ Ô ½.
All operations, unless indicated, are´ÑÓ Ôµ. ¯ is the maximum number of faulty agents. 
Properties and Complexity
In this section, we study the properties and the complexity of DMW. We provide proof sketches for the theorems characterizing the properties of DMW. Proof. (Sketch) The privacy of the identities and the bids is protected using a secret sharing scheme. At least agents must collude in order to expose the bids. Additionally, the number of colluding agents necessary to successfully expose bids is inversely proportional to the bid value, i.e., more colluding agents are required to violate the privacy of lower bids. The information cannot be used across mechanism executions as the information is only relevant to a specific execution as dictated by the scheduling on unrelated machines model.
Remark.
It is ideal to conceal the winner's identity, the first-price, and the second-price. The disclosure of the winner and the second-price is intrinsic to the distributed scheduling problem. The risk of divulging the winner is diminished by using pseudonyms to hide the real identities. The risk of disclosing the second-price is small as the information must be divulged to a third-party to receive payment. The disclosing of the first-price is a deficiency of the auction protocol that poses the greatest risk. The risk is mitigated as the agents cannot leverage the information to improve their positions during mechanism execution as all bids are submitted and committed before revelations. Furthermore, the information cannot assist the agents across mechanism executions since the information is only relevant to a specific execution as assumed in the scheduling model. Proof. (Sketch) We followed the practice outlined in [2] for calculating the computational complexity assuming that the cost of multiplication is equal to the cost of obtaining the multiplicative inverse, which is more costly than both additions and subtractions. We observe that the cost of bidding dominates the cost of all other stages; an agent computes ¢´Ñ ¢ Òµ shares by repeatedly applying Horner's Rule to solve (3). Since Ñ ÜÏ Ò, each share requires Ç´Òµ multiplications. Therefore, the overall computational cost is Ç´Ñ ¢ Ò ¾ µ.
Conclusion
We proposed a distributed scheduling mechanism for solving the problem of scheduling on unrelated machines. The agents collaboratively execute a Vickrey auction for each of the tasks to determine the allocation and the payment. The anonymity of the losing agents and the privacy of their bids is protected by using a secret-sharing scheme. We show that our proposed mechanism exhibits the strategic properties inherent to MinWork and thus is truthful. Furthermore, we show that the mechanism preserves the privacy of the losing agents by not revealing their identities or their bids. Lastly, we show that it is polynomial in terms of communication and complexity costs. In future work we are planning to apply similar cryptographic protocol-design techniques to devise secure distributed versions of other centralized mechanisms.
